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ABSTRACT
This article discusses how debates regarding intersectionality enable self- 
reflexitivity, positionality and critique, but also risk becoming routinized 
gestures in activist and academic settings. Through reflections on the notions 
of epistemic habits and epistemic whiteness, the article discusses key critiques 
of intersectional analysis, such as tendencies to re-centre whiteness, as 
a methodological concern. To illuminate the argument, I consider an example 
from a research project a colleague and I conducted on racialization and 
homonationalism in LGBTIQ activist work in a Finnish context, which brought 
up the question of whether our analysis reinforced or challenged whiteness. 
The aim of this article is to reflect on how intersectionality is a crucial concept 
for feminist knowledge production while also attending to and problematiz-
ing some presuppositions, that are routinely repeated as self-evident starting 
points in intersectionality research.
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1. Introduction
Intersectionality is, arguably, one of the most-debated concepts, methodologies and theories in 
contemporary academic feminism. Intersectionality has come to represent both the failures and 
successes of feminist theory and research as well as its political imaginaries. The discussion around 
the uses and misuses of the concept concerns the grammar of feminism, and the field’s attachments, 
affects, aspirations, desires and imaginaries in the stories we tell (Hemmings, 2011; Ilmonen, 2020; 
Lewis, 2013; Nash, 2019; Wiegman, 2012). Intersectionality scholarship makes visible the internal 
dynamics of academic feminism, its political investments, conflicts and disagreements. Robyn 
Wiegman writes that a key aspect of the ways in which feminist research and gender studies have 
come to understand their own task as a critical field is through a commitment to analyse their own 
“appropriations and complicities” in ways that perform the field as “a political agency” (Wiegman, 
2016, p. 89). Being self-reflective regarding one’s methodological and theoretical choices, and their 
presuppositions, is a cornerstone in feminist research and activism. As feminist reading and writing 
practices partake in racialized and gendered power formations, attention to situated knowledges 
(Haraway, 1991) and the kind of politics put forward in the name of feminism has become a key 
concern for the field. While intersectionality is a key concept in feminist academia, the literature on 
the concept also reflects the disciplinary demand that feminism be self-reflective and self-critical. 
A vast portion of the literature on intersectionality concerns various forms of criticism of its 
applications—displaying a critique of our own (Ilmonen, 2020; Nash, 2019).
In 2013, Maria Carbin and Sara Edenheim noted that, from “being a sign of threat and conflict to 
(white) feminism”, intersectionality had become a celebrated concept in Nordic feminist research, 
indicating a consensus regarding its usefulness (Carbin & Edenheim, 2013, p. 234).
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In the same year, however, US-based scholar Barbara Tomlinson analysed the work of several 
critics of intersectionality who, in her reading, put forward “destructive critiques of intersectionality 
that are damaging to feminist antisubordination scholarship and activism” (Tomlinson, 2013, 
p. 993, on the role of “the critic” in intersectionality debates, see Nash, 2019, pp. 33–80). In her 
analysis of feminist rhetoric on intersectionality at what she calls “the scene of argument”, 
Tomlinson (2013) suggests that meta-level argumentation risks distancing intersectionality from 
its roots in social justice activism and the experiences of women of colour. Carbin and Edenheim, 
on the other hand, write that although intersectionality has become the feminist theory, intersec-
tionality scholarship needs to clarify its theoretical presuppositions, and argue that “the very 
concept itself implies a certain ontology that cannot be overlooked without giving cause to 
theoretical confusion” (2013, p. 234).
The “meta-theoretical” discussions concerning whether intersectionality is best thought of as “a 
theory”, “a framework”, “a theory of marginalization”, “a theory of identity”, a “nodal point”, “a 
perspective” or “a method” have been criticized for causing theoretical confusion. They have been 
faulted for “confining intersectionality to an overly academic contemplative exercise” with no 
empirical connection, and for failing to address interrelated forms of oppression as a matter of 
social justice (De los Reyes, Molina, & Mulinari, 2003; Bilge, 2013; see also: Crenshaw, 2011; 
Tomlinson, 2013; Collins, 2015; Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013; Moi, 2017, p. 104; Carbin & 
Edenheim, 2013, pp. 235–238). Despite the useful reminder of how academic and activist work 
might differ, I suggest that these “meta-theoretical” discussions are nevertheless needed in order to 
reflect on what we mean when we speak of and use the concept of intersectionality as activists and 
academics, and to reflect on questions related to its applications in various contexts.
Despite the apparent, different critical perspectives on intersectionality, most scholars share an 
understanding of how claims of intersectionality are articulated within a field of argumentation 
constituted by power (Collins, 2015; Egeland & Gressgård, 2007; Nash, 2019; Tomlinson, 2013). 
The claims that power is constitutive of all subjects and that feminist discourses function as 
technologies of power can be read as key authorizing gestures in the fields of gender and feminist 
research, indicative of an understanding of the political nature of all knowledge production. Patricia 
Hill Collins, for example, writes that intersectionality’s “particular definitional dilemma” is that “it 
participates in the very power relations that it examines” (2015, p. 3). Therefore, she argues, 
attention to the presuppositions of knowledge claims made in the name of intersectionality is 
required. In an article on the theory, applications and praxis of intersectionality, Sumi Cho, 
Kimberlé Williams and Leslie McCall suggest that intersectionality is an analytic disposition. It is 
a way of thinking that is not determined by the use of the word “intersectionality” or by referencing 
standard citations in the literature. An intersectional analysis, they write, is “an intersectional way of 
thinking about the problem of sameness and difference and its relation to power”, and suggest that 
intersectionality, as a theory and praxis “neither travels outside nor is unmediated by the very field 
of race and gender power that it interrogates” (Cho et al., 2013, p. 795). These reminders to pay 
attention to the knowledge claims put forward in the name of intersectionality do not only concern 
the question of power in general, but are also related to another central theme in the debates on the 
ethics, politics and practices of intersectionality: namely, the concern of how race and racism 
through epistemologies of ignorance operate in feminism, both inside and outside of academia.
The literature on the ways in which intersectionality has been “colonized”, “commodified” or 
“appropriated” by white feminisms has shown how intersectionality debates themselves enact 
a politics of inclusion and exclusion, and how epistemic whiteness works, despite the proclamations 
of a self-critical academic feminism (Nash, 2019). Challenging, disrupting and actively undoing the 
epistemic whiteness of Nordic feminism in relation to intersectionality is thus a key concern (Lykke, 
2020). This requires an engagement with and undoing of those tendencies in Nordic feminism that 
render whiteness, race and racialization invisible, but also an analysis of the tools that are used in 
challenging those tendencies. Otherwise, the criticism of how whiteness operates risks serving the 
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subject positions of dominant white feminisms, and is reduced to a form of “feel-good anti-racism” 
(Cuesta & Mulinari, 2018).
In this article I discuss how the commitment to self-reflection, the insight that power saturates all 
research, and the risk of re-centring whiteness unfolded in a previous research project conducted 
with a colleague on homonationalism in Finnish and Swedish LGBTIQ activism (Peltonen & 
Jungar, 2018). The initial project asked how processes of racialization, gender, age, nationality 
and sexuality intersect in forming cultural understandings of “the self” and “others”. When writing 
our field notes from a panel discussion about LGBTIQ refugees at a Pride event in Finland, the 
question of whether our writing reinforced or challenged whiteness emerged (Peltonen & Jungar, 
2018). Did our writing, in its attempt to challenge whiteness, in fact reinforce white epistemologies? 
Drawing on this empirical example, I reflect on how the question of analysing one’s own appro-
priations and complicities, in this case me and my and colleague addressing each other’s whiteness, 
in an intersectional analysis became a question of methodological concern. The insight that critical 
whiteness studies may re-centre whiteness because of its choice of object is a question that has been 
circulating within the field of feminist, women’s and gender studies for decades (Ahmed, 2007; 
Wekker, 2016; Wiegman, 1999). I argue, as many before me, that this calls for an ongoing, careful 
examination of moments where it occurs, in order to challenge the habits that reproduce and 
circulate power relations of race in academia and elsewhere. Being attentive to these tendencies 
requires asking: “When do accountability and situatedness turn into unnecessary and counter-
productive gestures, more efficient in easing white guilt than unravelling racialised power structures 
in academic writing?” (Kyrölä, 2017).
I discuss this question through two concepts I call epistemic habits and epistemic whiteness, by 
which I refer to ways of thinking and modes of engaging with the world that through their habitual 
nature reproduce power relations. I relate my discussion of epistemic habits and epistemic white-
ness to the axiom that intersectionality research participates in the very power relations that it 
examines, as a key methodological and theoretical concern. This article aims to respond to the 
following question: Is there a way of thinking differently about intersectionality’s definitional 
dilemma?
Through attending to what Barbara Tomlinson has called rhetoric at the scene of the argument 
(Tomlinson, 2013, 2018) in her analysis of power relations in the writings of feminist researchers, 
I ask how different presuppositions in intersectionality scholarship might help or hinder to 
problematize epistemic habits and epistemic whiteness. Tomlinson’s close reading of discursive 
conventions and habits of argument in academic feminist writing attends failures of acknowledging 
“how our arguments are always already situated within fields of power” (2018, p. 993). In relation to 
this thematic, I problematize ways of analysing and understanding “intersectionality’s definitional 
dilemma” that rely on what Toril Moi calls theoreticism—“the idea that theoretical correctness 
somehow guarantees political correctness” (Moi, 1999, p. 59). Considering questions of complicity 
and power as a result of an analysis, not as a presupposition saturating all cases, encounters and 
descriptions in research, requires more work, of course. It requires keeping in mind that feminist 
thought ought to “remain self-critical with respect to the totalizing gestures of feminism” (Butler, 
1990, pp. 18–19). Finally, I propose that there might be a need to rethink the way power and 
complicity are envisioned, not only within intersectional research, but within the field of feminist 
and gender research more broadly. In this article I do not explicitly discuss research on racialization 
and homonationalism in the Nordic context, but focus on methodological questions raised in an 
extract from a previously published joint article (Peltonen & Jungar, 2018). I do not claim that this 
example stands in for all cases where the question or risk of reinforcing whiteness occurs. However, 
I see it as an illuminating example of the larger problematic of habitual or routinized ways of 
thinking that reinforce power relations and racialization in feminist research—what Gloria Wekker 
in her criticism of how identification works subconsciously and therefore reproduces racialized 
power relations calls the problem of lazy identification patterns (Wekker, 2016, p. 170).
NORA—NORDIC JOURNAL OF FEMINIST AND GENDER RESEARCH 3
2. Epistemic habits, epistemic whiteness and complicity
The concept of complicity, significant in feminist postcolonial theorizing, has in the Nordic context 
been used to describe the ways in which countries such as Finland have assumed an ambiguous 
“outsider” status in discussions of colonialism, by virtue of not having had overseas colonies. It also 
concerns Nordic participation in colonialism in the Arctic, and as a concept should be comple-
mented with decolonial perspectives on intra-Nordic power relations, as suggested by Sámi and 
other indigenous scholars (Keskinen, 2019; Knobblock & Kuokkanen, 2015). The concept of 
“colonial complicity” illuminates the processes of being implicated in a history of slavery and 
colonialism, through participation in practices of difference making and oppression via cultural 
representation and knowledge production (Keskinen, Tuori, Irni, & Mulinari, 2009). Complicity 
here refers to the processes through which “our minds were ‘colonised’ into an acceptance of 
colonial projects” (Vuorela, 2009, p. 21). The notion of complicity is also key to postcolonial 
feminist Gayatri Spivak’s work, surfacing in her take on deconstruction as an interrogation of 
how truths and knowledges are produced. A critical inquiry into the discourses one interrogates 
involves, as she phrases it, “a persistent critique of what one cannot not want” (Spivak, 1996, pp. 
27–28). Spivak’s remarks concern how scholarly ambitions tacitly might reflect colonial mindsets, 
and highlights therefore how a critical approach requires an analysis of the epistemic habits that 
saturate feminist academic work.
In speaking of epistemic habits, I have in mind particular theoretical understandings that are 
referenced habitually, similarly to what Sara Ahmed has described as routinized theoretical ges-
tures, that “become a background, something taken for granted as a common reference point such 
that it is not noticeable, and hence has not really been engaged with as involving a specific set of 
claims” (2008, p. 25). She references both key literature within feminist theory and an impression 
“that has accumulated over time” in conversations with friends, colleagues and participants at 
conferences (2008, p. 25). In a similar way to Ahmed (2008), Wiegman (2012), and Hemmings 
(2011), I understand epistemic habits as not “just” a matter of what we learn as we become 
enculturated within a particular academic climate or style, but also as a concern about how we 
think about what we learn (Liljeström & Peltonen, 2017). Habits are, of course, not in themselves 
either good or bad, but can become troublesome obstacles, excluding other ways of thinking, as 
much as they can spur fruitful dialogue. The question that interests me here is when do habits 
become constrictive, or even counter-productive?
My use of the term epistemic whiteness is influenced by various descriptions of the ways in which 
racialized, embodied practices tacitly inform our ways of knowing and understanding the world 
(Wekker, 2016). I understand the concept of racialization to not only concern how bodies and 
subjectivities are racialized through processes of othering, cultural signification and social structures, 
but to include ways in which “race is present in a shadowlike existence ‘between the lines’ and ‘in the 
air’”, and how whiteness “works”, and functions as the unspoken norm (Hvenegård-Lassen & Staunæs, 
2020, p. 1; Keskinen & Andreassen, 2017, p. 65). In speaking of epistemic whiteness, I have in mind the 
way in which processes of racialization come to function as a mode of preunderstanding that 
illuminates how this unspoken norm works and the kind of understanding it entails. The term is 
also inspired by Ahmed’s suggestion that “whiteness could be described as an ongoing and unfinished 
history, which orientates bodies in specific directions” indicative of how colonialism has shaped and 
shapes the world of whiteness and “white” ways of thinking (2007, p. 150). Ahmed focuses on the 
performativity of whiteness (what it does) but is also aware of a challenge to this work:
We could say that any project that aims to dismantle or challenge the categories that are made invisible 
through privilege is bound to participate in the object of its critique. We might even expect such projects to 
fail, and be prepared to witness this failure as productive. And yet, we can get stuck in this position, endlessly 
caught up in describing what we are doing to whiteness, rather than what whiteness is doing (2007, pp. 
149–150).
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Inspired by Ahmed, my concern in this article regards how academic feminism might end up 
reinforcing the very dynamics it sets out to contest, due to particular theoretical presuppositions of 
how power, race or whiteness “work”. I argue that this tendency in itself can be interpreted as an 
“epistemic habit” that white feminisms, in their uneasiness in dealing with race and racism, are 
prone to repeat.
3. Debating and narrating intersectionality
The way in which epistemic whiteness has functioned in feminist discussions of intersectionality is 
a central thematic in the assessments of feminist narratives around intersectionality. Sirma Bilge 
argues that intersectionality has been de-politized through neoliberalism and a whitening of the 
concept in ways that re-centre Eurocentric epistemologies. Tomlinson, writing in the context of US 
academia, suggests that European feminisms’ managing of intersectionality “reinscribe[s] racial 
dominance at the scene of argument . . . As a result, the subject position of the white woman tends 
to be unmarked within its own discourse, but visible to those it seeks to manage” (Tomlinson, 2018, 
pp. 147–48; see also: Bilge, 2017; Carbin & Edenheim, 2013). This tendency has also been highlighted 
as a problem in Nordic feminist research on intersectionality. In the context of Nordic feminist 
academia, intersectionality entered the debates through postcolonial feminisms (De los Reyes, Molina, 
& Mulinari, 2002) analysing and problematizing processes of nationalism and racialization, and in 
studying how sexuality, gender, race and class are co-constructed and intersect. Intersectionality has, 
in particular, functioned as a call to address racist practices within academic feminism and to avoid 
practices of exclusion within feminist thought and research (De los Reyes et al., 2002). However, it has 
also been criticized for signposting an awareness of intersecting categories without actually speaking 
about race or racialization in more detail (Bilge, 2013; Lykke, 2020).
Early writings on intersectionality in the Nordic context in the 2000s (De los Reyes et al., 2002; 
De los Reyes & Mulinari, 2005; Lykke, 2003) were part of a discussion concerning white feminisms’ 
failures in addressing discussions of race, ethnicity and migration. But the concept was also 
introduced as way to deal with and manage the tensions and anxiety that the criticism caused 
(Carbin & Edenheim, 2013, p. 244), which in itself can be seen as a habitual response of white 
feminisms in the face of accusations of racism. The concept has since been established in Nordic 
feminist research, not only for analysing how “class, race and gender” intersect, but recently also 
developed in relation to feminist pedagogy and indigenous studies, and feminist new materialisms, 
taking intersectionality into concerns beyond anthropocentrism (Laukkanen, Miettinen, 
Elonheimo, Ojala, & Saresma, 2018; Olsen, 2018; Tiainen, Leppänen, Kontturi, & Mehrabi, 2020).
Intersectionality has taken differing routes within various geopolitical contexts, a thematic that 
in itself has spurred debate around the contextual situatedness of the concept. The meaning and 
genealogy of the term, as well as its roots in black feminism, have been much debated. While the 
concept’s rootedness in the US context, foregrounding black feminist theory and analyses of 
racialization and racism, is usually highlighted, in the uptake of intersectionality in the European 
context, the role of race—or rather, the lack of engagement with race—has been a key criticism 
(Lewis, 2013; Bilge, 2013, 2014). Despite the fact that reminders of intersectionality’s roots in black 
feminism have been problematized as a “routinized gesture” that risks reducing black feminisms to 
intersectionality, it should be kept in mind, as Kaisa Ilmonen writes, that “it would be unethical to 
obscure intersectionality’s relationship to its conceptual home in black feminism” (2020, p. 255).
“[T]he fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking”, as formulated by the 
Combahee River Collective (1977/1982), received an umbrella term when intersectionality entered 
academic feminist debates, particularly though the uptake of Kimberlé Crenshaw’s work. Through 
various analyses of the politics of feminist storytelling, scholars such as Jennifer Nash, Patricia Hill 
Collins and Sirma Bilge have in various ways attended to the tendency of telling what Gail Lewis 
describes as a “well-rehearsed story” (2013, p. 871), of citing Crenshaw coining the term inter-
sectionality, (although she did introduce the term as an intervention in legal studies). The well- 
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rehearsed gesture, which can be characterized as an “epistemic habit”, involves citing just one 
African American woman to situate the term’s origins in black feminism, despite a broader archive 
of work analysing overlapping forms of oppression in various ways. The ambivalence of this 
narrative is seen in relation to the broader tendencies of the politics of citation in feminist academia. 
According to Patricia Hill Collins, the narrative “fosters a collective ritual that legitimates this 
particular origin story” in ways that often disregard the diversity of Crenshaw’s work, reflecting 
a larger lack of engagement with black feminist work in academic feminism (Collins, 2015, p. 10; 
Carasthatis, 2014; Collins & Bilge, 2016). Jennifer Nash, positioned as one of the “critics” in the 
debate, suggests that this tendency to “originalism” functions as a deflection from attention to non- 
identitarian work in black feminism and “the myriad of political traditions that have long been part 
of black feminism, but that are often ignored because of the extent of intersectionality’s institutio-
nalization” (Nash, 2011, p. 5, 2019). This self-critical work thus shows how analyses of intersec-
tionality are needed in order to break with the tendencies that uphold a politics of inclusion and 
exclusion. Nash has also shown how intersectionality debates have fostered a story of “villains” and 
“saviors”, where “black feminism’s primary task is to discipline so-called white feminism and 
women’s studies” on the one hand, producing a defensiveness that “hinders black feminism’s 
theoretical and political imagination rather than unleashing it” on the other (2019, pp. 136–137). 
In calling to animate black feminist thought, Nash (2019, pp. 35, 73, 130–131) suggests “letting go” 
of the kind of politics that defensively makes the term into property to be guarded. Nash’s analysis 
of how the grammar of intersectionality operates in the field reveals both reductive and stagnating 
tendencies. But Nash’ analysis also highlights how the politics of citation and representation of 
intersectionality matter, as an affective, ethical and political practice. This calls for a growing 
awareness and analyses of some deep-rooted, well-established, and sometimes almost self-evident 
epistemic habits that reside within feminist thinking. Many of these epistemic habits are related to 
ideas and understandings of critical feminist thinking in both academic feminist and activist 
contexts. One example is the presence of inclusive/universalist reasoning despite continuous high-
lighting of the importance of differences and diversity of identities, and the tendency to emphasize 
the power relations implicit in all scholarly writing (Carbin & Edenheim, 2013; Egeland & 
Gressgård, 2007; Tomlinson, 2018).
This thematic has in the Nordic context of intersectionality also fostered a meta-theoretical 
discussion around its epistemological implications. Intersectionality’s ability to analyse complexity 
and difference has been framed particularly in relation to poststructuralist feminisms (Carbin & 
Edenheim, 2013; Lykke, 2011; Karkulehto et al., 2012; Staunaes, 2003). Egeland and Gressgård 
(2007), for example, argue that intersectionality research in its desire to manage the complexity of 
social life assumes a problematic realist epistemology. They suggest intersectionality research is 
spurred by a “will to empower” marginalized subjects, ignoring “the ‘will to power’ inherent in all 
knowledge production and politics”, and suggest that intersectionality research instead reproduces 
reductionist thinking of identity, which is something feminist research should problematize (2007, 
p. 217). Intersectionality research, they argue, assumes the existence of categories in analysing social 
complexities, rather than questioning the construction of these categories and what is meant by 
“complexity” in intersectional analyses in the first place. Carbin and Edenheim (2013) in a similar 
manner suggest that intersectionality is characterized by a refusal to engage in poststructuralist and 
postcolonial anti-foundational perspectives:
It may be that poststructuralism, as it is defined within intersectionality research, is rather used as a general 
symbol of a multidimensional, nuanced and complex view on power; a perspective that brings to the fore 
concepts such as differences and complexities, and therefore thought of as somehow needed within the field. 
Yet, the basic premise of poststructuralism is missing in this inclusion: that of the fundamental impossibility of 
accurately representing the world (2013, p. 243, emphasis added).
Firmly rooted in poststructuralist feminist theory, Carbin and Edenheim suggest that intersection-
ality is a de-politicized “feminist theory” that provides “an ontology of neither the subject nor 
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power” (2013, p. 245). For Carbin and Edenheim, intersectionality must be disassociated from 
poststructuralist, postcolonial feminist thought, the anti-foundationalist approach, and the proble-
matization of difference, identity and subjectivity prevalent in these traditions. Through the ethos of 
inclusivity, they argue that “conflicts seem to be foreclosed” in debates on intersectionality, as these 
overlook the “already existing feminism that has worked with issues of power in more than one 
dimension” (2013, p. 241), thereby suggesting a difference between identitarian frameworks and 
those disputing them to lie at the heart of a disagreement of how to assess the criticality of 
intersectionality. But the question becomes whether the indicated distinction between consensus- 
seeking intersectionality and conflict-acknowledging poststructuralist approaches is really as ten-
able as is suggested (Carbin & Edenheim, 2013). In what follows I discuss how the question of these 
different epistemologies is related to the question of whether the intersectional analysis and mode of 
writing in the previously mentioned research project re-centred whiteness.
4. An example: Re-centring whiteness?
In an earlier research project on how categories such as race, gender, age, nationality and sexuality 
intersect in forming cultural understandings of “the self” and “others” in LGBTIQ activism in 
Finland, the methodological reflections actualized the question of whether our analysis and writing 
re-centred whiteness. The extract I analyse here was part of a self-critical dialogue (in the form of 
field notes) that attempted to critically scrutinize our situated knowledges (Haraway, 1991) and to 
hold us accountable for our knowledge production, in relation to both activist and academic 
contexts. In 2016, the event “Turku Pride: Panel debate on LGBTIQ+ sensitivity in the asylum 
process” was arranged by Amnesty International and the Evangelical Lutheran State Church, during 
pride week in the city of Turku in Finland. The invited panellists addressed the topic of LGBTIQ 
asylum seekers and refugees as experts in their various fields, and the discussion centred on different 
state practices, legal issues, the work of Migri (the Finnish Immigration Service), the health and 
well-being of refugees, and experiences of refugee work among local churches. The panel did not 
include anyone with the “expertise” or experience of either being or speaking as a queer refugee or 
asylum seeker. During the two-hour discussion the panellists invoked several tropes and figures of 
othering, highlighting problems of different customs and norms regarding gender-based violence, 
gender politics and cultural understandings and customs of gender equality, in a manner that 
reinforced images of a “civilized West” and the “uncivilized rest” typical to neonationalist rhetoric 
in Finland and elsewhere (Keskinen, 2018). The abstract figure of “queer refugees” circulated in the 
discussion in a manner that reiterated Eurocentric notions of “Muslim cultures” and saviour 
narratives of saving brown queers from brown hetero-patriarchy, to paraphrase Spivak’s analysis 
of colonial discourses (Jungar & Peltonen, 2015, 2016). The audience was asked not to interrupt 
during the two-hour-long discussion. Attending the panel was thus utterly frustrating, which 
I expressed in my field notes.
The panel is addressing ‘LGBTQ refugees’ that they know exist in the reception centers, but are silenced by 
fear, living in fear and often silenced by shame. If only they knew that it is okay to be gay in Finland! It is their 
right! It is declared in the panel over and over again. I look at the serious expressions on the panel; I listen to 
the well-meaning words and feel more and more uncomfortable. I think of queer knowledge, of my friends for 
whom there is no ‘safe space’, where contemporary Finland, and public space, with its everyday situations, 
pose a constant threat to their person because they do not pass, because they ‘are’ genderqueer. I think about 
my friend who recently was beaten up for being gay. Of how families excluded members and parents who have 
cut off all ties with their children because they are gay. I think of what would happen if we gathered a crowd of 
Finns, mostly men, and put them together in a camp—what kind of ambiance and understanding that would 
prevail there (Peltonen & Jungar, 2018, pp. 62–63).
When my co-author read my notes, she reacted to my use of a logic of similarity in questioning 
a logic of difference as a risk of centring whiteness. She responded:
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Thank you for sending the text, great work! I however find your reflexive field notes somewhat problematic. 
I understand where you are coming from and what you are trying to convey, but there is something that 
troubles me in your notes. You try to deconstruct what they are saying by comparing what they are saying 
about “Muslim cultures” with Finland. In reaction to white feminism and colonial feminism I have done that 
a lot myself. Finland for example has the highest statistics of domestic violence in Western Europe, and I have 
repeatedly brought this up and reacted in situations where a discourse on the violence of men in or from the 
global South becomes a trope of othering. It kind of works, but it also does not. There is a danger that the 
issues raised by for example Arab queer activists become less visible in such a discourse (and Finnish queer 
suffering takes centre stage). At the same time there must be a way of listening to and talking to, for example, 
refugees, acknowledging the homophobia in other countries without at the same time making Finnish 
homophobia invisible. This is very much what you are striving to do. The way to do this differently though, 
is not necessarily by looking for similarities. Similarities are of course interesting but I feel focusing on 
similarities is a bit risky as the main counter discourse, and paradoxically centres white queer suffering 
(Peltonen & Jungar, 2018, p. 63).
My field notes, written as a reaction to the imagined construction of Finland in relation to its 
imagined racialized “other” in the panel discussion, raised the question: Do the notes of the panel in 
themselves problematically centre whiteness through their description of “queer suffering” in 
a Finnish context? This question is not surprising, as it follows the key axioms of the field: the 
intersectional analytic of “thinking about the problem of sameness and difference and its relation to 
power” and the awareness that feminist research, reading, writing and interpretation practices 
“participates in the very power relations that it examines” (Collins, 2015; Cho et al., 2013, p. 795; 
Egeland & Gressgård, 2007; Tomlinson, 2018).
In this case, the question concerns how epistemologies of ignorance and epistemic whiteness are 
revealed in the details of the analysis of how difference and similarities work in the panel in 
question. Nonetheless, the extract from the field notes can also be read as challenging the power 
relations they interrogate, in this instance “white” ways of experiencing, knowing and interpreting 
the world. What interests me, what interests me in analysing this example are the questions: Does 
the “awareness” of reflecting on our own positionality, through asking the questions of complicity 
and power, in and of itself articulate a kind of “epistemic habit” in feminist research? Does it “do 
work” beyond indicating an awareness of the fact that we are not always in control of how our 
words and thinking, phrasing and analyses are understood and interpreted? What I wish to 
highlight here is that although the commitment to analysing our own appropriations and compli-
cities is a key axiom in the field—a critique of our own—in acknowledging this “danger” of 
complicity one might ask, are we not by the same logic constructing a problematic setup of 
complicity? This kind of question is often ascribed to “meta-theory” or described as “writing 
meta text about metatext” (Ilmonen, 2020, p. 351), but I argue that such reflections are necessary 
as modes of careful reading and ethical engagement, so as to deepen the understanding of how ways 
of thinking, based in theory, shape the analytical perspectives we engage with.
5. Identification and disidentification, and habitual workings of whiteness
The field notes written at the panel discussion express my situatedness and positionality vis-à-vis 
feminist, anti-racist and queer politics in a Finnish context. The field notes were written from the 
perspective of an intersectional analytic attending to “thinking about the problem of sameness and 
difference and its relation to power” (Cho et al., 2013, p. 795), in an attempt to make visible how 
a particular understanding of the world unfolded as “white” in the panel discussion, showing the 
operation of the white optics Ahmed speaks of as inherited histories that position bodies differently 
(Ahmed, 2007). Invoking a logic of similarity, applying the panellists’ arguments regarding “our” 
(Finnish) culture, I suggest, reveals how “epistemic whiteness” works as routinized and habitual 
ways of understanding the world. The logic of similarity displays how Finnish exceptionalism and 
“gay-friendliness” is constructed in the context of the panel discussion through a logic of difference 
and images of othering, thus erasing Finnish homophobia and homonationalism (Peltonen & 
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Jungar, 2018, pp. 63–64). The aim is to reveal the kind of orientation of whiteness and identification 
that enacts a politics of inclusion and exclusion through imagined belongings. It might, however, 
also be read as an example of the ways in which intersectionality’s definitional dilemma becomes 
articulated, of how one participates in the very power relations that one examines, in risky ways, in 
this case by re-centring whiteness. Does my description of the violent effects of homonationalism 
imply I am complicit in the epistemic whiteness my description is aimed to question? Can what 
happens here be an example of the kind of failure Ahmed speaks of, and if so, can it be productive? 
Can one read the field notes as an example of reactions and thinking patterns that are habitual, 
unreflective, “lazy identification patterns” (Wekker, 2016)?
In White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race, Gloria Wekker (2016) uses the term 
“lazy identification patterns” to refer to how whiteness works at the level of the unconscious in 
relation to how racism works tacitly, precisely, in the sense of being habitual, routinized responses 
(Wekker, 2016, pp. 168–173). With the heading “But What about the Captain?”, the title of the coda 
in White Innocence, Wekker provides an example of how these lazy identification patterns operate. 
Wekker describes an event arranged to mark the 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery in the 
Dutch empire, and where Saidiya Hartman read an extract from her book Lose Your Mother: 
A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route (2007). Hartman tells the story of an enslaved girl on the 
ship Recovery, being abused by the ship’s captain and then brutally killed, and the captain’s 
subsequent acquittal in the murder. After the distressing story of sexual and physical abuse, 
Wekker writes, “a thick silence settles in the room . . . Before the silence can become uncomfortable, 
it is broken by a white middle-aged man, who straightforwardly asks, “But what about the captain?” 
(2016, p. 169). Wekker describes how this man, in breaking the silence, as the first one to speak out 
by posing this question, re-centres whiteness, by identifying with the captain, another white man, 
despite the atrocities he has committed. Wekker elaborates on the politics of consciousness here as 
a matter of one’s positionality in terms of race and gender, but also in relation to questions of 
entitlement, and shows how this example of identification and disidentification sheds light on the 
fearful avoidance, aggressive ignorance and entitlement of whiteness, and how it works habitually. 
“From which frame of mind does such a question emerge?” she asks, writing that his question 
encapsulates white self-representation and entitlement (2016, p. 169). Our identification patterns 
are not innocent and often function as collective cultural patterns of racializing ourselves and 
others. In her analysis, Wekker suggests that perhaps the man in the audience is reaching for “some 
kind of shared humanity”, trying to find an answer, to understand the captain’s actions. (The man, 
N.N, Wekker writes, is a progressive leftist politician of the Labour Party in the Netherlands, known 
for his support of anti-racist politics). In order to unlearn these kinds of lazy identification patterns, 
we must bring them into our consciousness and understand our positionality “along the lines of 
race and gender” as Wekker (2016, p. 171) suggests. In other words, do the work of unlearning, and 
disidentification.
Reading the notes that express my discomfort regarding the panel discussion in the light of 
Wekker’s discussion of habitual identifications brings up the question of why and how my emotions 
play into my interpretation. Despite the different examples here (my co-author’s reaction to my 
writing and the man asking about the captain), both indicate the need for suspending one’s 
judgement in order to achieve change in responding to racialized patterns—one’s own, and those 
displayed by others. Perhaps my counter-description can be interpreted as an instance of “epistemic 
whiteness” not dissimilar to the man’s reaction in Wekker’s example. In suggesting a similarity in 
experiences of heteronormativity and the effects of how differences are made in the name of 
sexuality and identity, in general, there is a risk, as suggested by my co-author, of erasing the 
importance of contextualizing differences when it comes to degrees of violence and “gay- 
friendliness” in different contexts. On this reading, the way in which a politics of similarity and 
difference plays itself out in my field notes follows a general epistemic habit of whiteness to re- 
centre itself. The “failure” on this reading, is not articulating a complex enough picture of the 
counter-discourse I attempt to provide. However, the claim that “white queer suffering” risks taking 
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centre stage through invoking an example of what Sarah Schulman (2009) has called familial 
homophobia, on the other hand, seems only to work if the assumption a priori is that any 
description of “queer suffering” in a Finnish context will re-centre whiteness. This move implicitly 
equates Finnish or Finnish-queer with whiteness, in a way that essentializes the dynamics of power 
relations in problematic ways.
Following the axiomatic thinking Wiegman describes in relation to the commitment of feminist 
research to analyse its own appropriations and complicities and Hill Collins’s definition of inter-
sectionality’s definitional dilemma, critique is focused on emphasizing exclusion, on normalizing 
power, on historical complicity and on acknowledging a violent imposition of a racialized order, as 
my colleague’s remarks highlight. My description can therefore be interpreted as bearing 
a similarity to the epistemic habit of writing in a way that forecloses brown experiences and 
activism, not dissimilar to the ways in which citation practices in intersectionality scholarship 
reduce black feminism to the concept of intersectionality. One might also suggest that my writing 
tacitly assumes a particular Finnish masculinity to represent racist, homophobic structures of 
oppression, ignoring an analysis of “Finnish men” as an intersectional category as well as the fact 
that women have a prominent role in white nationalist far-right activities in Finland (Keskinen, 
2018). Although my notes responding to the language of identity through a logic of similarity were 
written as critical remarks on the panellists’ understanding of “homosexual” and “lesbian refugees” 
in terms of identity, the language of the state practices in Finland (Migri), and the tacit role 
whiteness played in the panellists’ speech, my notes perhaps fail to communicate this thought, if 
the description in itself is seen as essentializing these terms or categories.
My writing can also, however, be an example of understanding that the categories we live with 
(even if unthinkingly) are already intersectional in nature, that we are not walking and talking 
essences of whiteness, womanhood, heterosexuality, queerness or Finnishness. In other words, 
there must be ways to critique the intersection of nationalism, gender, sexuality and racialization, 
and use categories in ways that, while describing the workings of epistemic whiteness, do not 
reinforce what they set out to critique. Therefore, to see a similarity between cases and forms of 
oppression is also an acknowledgement of how intersectional analyses work in revealing inter-
related forms of oppression (in this case gender and sexuality are in focus). The suggestion that 
whiteness again takes centre stage is important to consider and is a critical remark on the politics of 
knowledge production in feminist academia and activism. But, it can also become a generalizing 
gesture that ignores the particularities of the context. In the case of the panel discussion at the pride 
event, epistemic whiteness was centred, and there must be possibilities of making this visible, 
“looking into how truths are produced” (Spivak, 1996, pp. 27–28) and to describe this process, 
without it necessarily enacting a politics of exclusion.
6. Re-assessing the critique of what one cannot not want
If we take the question of complicity seriously, highlighting (Arab or other) queer activism doesn’t 
necessarily omit the problematic of homonationalism. However, it complicates the question of what 
criteria to reference regarding who gets to speak, for whom and on what terms (Alcoff, 1991). 
Feminist reading and writing are political practices, in acknowledging one’s positionality and 
implicatedness in racialized power relations. Could I have responded otherwise in my writing 
and critical remarks, and what would those alternative responses have been?
Instead of focusing on similarities in the everyday lives of queers in different contexts (suggesting 
a queer commons?), I could have highlighted the way in which the panel, in suggesting Finnish 
sexual exceptionalism, is an example and expression of an imperialist logic, part of a larger shift in 
a neoliberal context. Puar writes that “[a]s such, homonationalism is not a synonym for gay racism, 
rather a deep critique of liberal attachments to identity and rights-based discourses that rely on 
identitarian formations” (Puar, quoted in Schotten, 2016, p. 359). As the criticism of the panel is 
about homonationalist tendencies in LGBTIQ work, the content of the panel could be analysed 
10 S. ALDRIN SALSKOV
through the various uses of “homonationalism”, analysing the logic of sexual exceptionalism, “queer 
as regulatory” (Puar, 2007), or the ascendency of whiteness (Chow, 2000), using a more “technical” 
vocabulary, distancing myself from the vernacular of identity that the panellists used when speaking 
of “LGBTQ refugees” (which largely is what my colleague and I did in our article).
The various interpretations suggested above can be read as playing on the difference between 
operating within a realist epistemology and a poststructuralist one. Carbin and Edenheim claim that 
intersectionality research has failed in understanding the basic premises of poststructuralism, which 
they suggest is “the fundamental impossibility of accurately representing the world” (2013, p. 243). 
This is similar to how Spivak formulates her understanding of deconstruction as a mode of practice 
and critique that interrogates how truths are produced, in stating that “metaphysical enclosures” are 
unavoidable (Spivak, 1996, pp. 27–28). The question is, what kind of “truths” does these remarks 
indicate? Spivak points to the importance of suspending judgement, of being alert to the kinds of 
identification patterns our culture lures us into, but also highlights how we are trapped in the 
discourses we aim to question, suggesting that we cannot escape metaphysical enclosures. I want to 
challenge this idea.
When writing about whiteness and homonationalism, the risk of re-centring whiteness is 
inherent in the work of critique itself, if failure is understood as a priori, always already part of 
the problem it seeks to illuminate. If any description of social reality is taken as an a priori failure to 
accurately represent the world, I suggest there is a need to rethink this “axiom” of what descriptions 
of the social can do, beyond the deconstructive setup of always interrogating the conditions that 
make a particular representation, category or logic possible. To “stay with the trouble”, as Donna 
Haraway (2016) urges us to do, means to engage with difficulties, but there is also a need to question 
those epistemic habits that in a theoreticist manner, claim a generality that instals complicity at the 
heart of the matter as a constitutive failure.
In discussing what happened in the panel and in our field notes, my colleague highlights the role 
and voice of queer Arab activists and the expertise they have in relation to questions queer refugees 
face, suggesting the criticism of how the intersecting imaginary of sexuality, nationhood and gender 
risk re-centring whiteness. On the other hand, I highlight the panellists’ epistemic positions as not 
only ignorant, “white” and “Finnish”, but heteronormative and homonationalist, highlighting the 
lack of expertise the panellists have regarding both queer and brown lives in general and in Finland 
in particular. What my colleague reacts to is thus a different question than the one I am trying to 
raise. We are addressing a similar thematic, but through different questions and emphasis. When read 
in this light, analysing a logic of similarities and differences can illuminate how power works, and 
indeed function as a critical analytic disposition, beyond an ever-present risk of re-centring white-
ness. I am not disputing the risk or the habits of re-centring whiteness as such. Rather, I want to 
problematize the tendency in feminist scholarship to presuppose the risk itself (and to theoretically 
justify the presupposition) as always already inherent in the problematic engaged with, in order to 
suggest that a “careful examination of the world as it appears does not imply a capitulation to the 
way things are” (Love, 2017, p. 69).
7. Concluding remarks
How, then, are we to think about the ways in which identities and categories intersect (both in 
researchers and in the objects of the research), and what their analytical power can be in discussing 
questions of race, feminist knowledge production, power and politics? These are, as someone 
reminded me, “mega” questions, but also questions that are important to ask.
I want to suggest that there is a way in which we tend to think about concepts, intersecting 
categories, language use and descriptions as always exclusionary and inclusionary, as always 
a matter of power, that is expressive of a particular epistemic habit in feminist scholarship. I have 
in mind a picture of the social world as a battlefield of meaning, where any description or text is 
understood as always participating in the power relations it examines.
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In this article I have argued that scholars need to be careful not to reinforce the question of the 
complicity of whiteness as an epistemic habit that in itself reinforces whiteness because of particular 
theoretical and/or political commitments. Reading intersectionally is suggested as a method against 
the kind of habitual criticism that has excluded the ways in which race is key to the aims, goals and 
questions of the field. But, as Hill Collins, Nash, Tomlinson, Carbin and Edenheim, and others have 
shown, there is no guarantee that intersectionality will not be used exactly in the critical sense that it 
opposes. What, then, guarantees a non-dismissive, accountable, truly critical approach? I would say 
nothing does. There are no guarantees in doing critique; what one does is to risk one’s judgement 
(Moi, 2017; Wiegman, 2016). But this does not mean that failure or risks are an inherent part of the 
work we do, although it might be. The brief example I discussed here illustrates what me and my 
colleague saw as the other’s habitual way of thinking. The exercise of reading the exchange between 
my co-author and myself highlights how the presuppositions that I began this article with can come 
to function as epistemic habits, but also suggests that the various epistemic claims in the intersection-
ality debates need not be understood as so mutually exclusively as they might appear at first glance.
I suggest that the analytic dispositions of intersectionality, described as thinking about sameness and 
difference and their relation to power, and as a theory and praxis that is complicit in the power relations 
interrogated, constitute theoretisist perspectives on feminist reading and writing practices. Similarly, the 
suggestion that all arguments are always already situated within fields of power risk becoming 
a totalizing gesture and mode of “representing the world” that has no other justification than that of 
being a theoretical idea in and of itself. If we let go of the idea that we are trapped in metaphysical 
enclosures, or that power is always present in all feminist practices, Spivak’s words can serve as 
a reminder that “every practice of knowledge production is both a compromise with multiple histories 
and an insecure venture in an unjust world” (Love, 2017, p. 62), not necessarily a matter of how power is 
inherent in all knowledge production. I suggest that a statement such as “power is inherent in all 
knowledge production”, or the claim that it is fundamentally an impossibility to accurately represent the 
world, articulate what Toril Moi calls theoreticism: “the idea that theoretical correctness somehow 
guarantees political correctness” (Moi, 1999, p. 59). It suggests that these arguments have political value 
as critical perspectives in analysing (intersecting) power relations, however the presence of power is 
presumed rather than investigated. As analytic dispositions these remarks function as what Robyn 
Wiegman calls political imaginaries of the alternative (2016, p. 84) and, I suggest, as generalized 
statements that risk closing, rather than opening up, possibilities of interpretation.
Taking seriously the intersectional insight that various categories intersect, that power differ-
entials must be read together, suggests that there are different positions, categories and intersections 
that need to be analysed case by case. It is only if we habitually analyse and assume power to work as 
“always already” a matter of complicity, that the danger of “reiterating what one seeks to contest” 
becomes a problem, inherent in the very language and descriptions operated with. Therefore being 
open to a variety of interpretations is pivotal, so as to avoid problematic epistemic habits that as 
imaginaries of the political, function in ways that foreclose other possibilities of interpretation, 
understanding, and critically engaging with the world. As Heather Love suggests, “descriptions of 
the world as it is should not be confused with an endorsement of the status quo” (Love, 2017, p. 53).
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